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Family
Family; child custody--examination of child witnesses in court proceedings
Family Code § 3042 (amended).
SB 1700 (Hart); 1994 STAT. Ch. 596
Existing law mandates that a court consult with children of suitable age and
discretion as to their preference before granting or altering custody of the
children.'
Chapter 596 requires the court to control examinations of child witnesses in
accordance with the California Evidence Code2 and in such a manner that the best
interests of the child are protected. Furthermore, Chapter 596 authorizes the court
1. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (amended by Chapter 596); see id. (leaving undefined, however, standards
to determine what constitutes sufficient age and capacity to reason); see also id. § 7891(a)(3) (West 1994)
(directing children over the age of 10 to meet in the judge's chambers to discuss the child's preference as to
custody); Rosson v. Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1103,224 Cal. Rptr. 250,256 (1986) (permitting the trial
judge to consider the preferences of two children determined to be mature by a mediator, despite their being
only 10 and 13 years old); Detrich v. Dorothy H., 106 Cal. App. 3d 257, 269, 165 Cal. Rptr. 646,653 (1980)
(holding that although it is not required, it is clear that the Legislature prefers a child to be interviewed as to
their parental preference in child custody proceedings); Mehlmauer v. Mehlmauer, 60 Cal. App. 3d 104, 110,
131 Cal. Rptr. 325, 329 (1976) (ruling that a trial court was not bound to follow a child's preference in custody
proceedings, but was merely obligated to give the child's wishes consideration); Messer v. Messer, 259 Cal.
App. 2d 507, 509, 66 Cal. Rptr. 417,418 (1968) (allowing the court to consider the preference of the minor
child in a custody proceeding); Tarling v. Tarling, 186 Cal. App. 2d 8, 12, 8 Cal. Rptr. 621, 624 (1960)
(finding that the trial judge's refusal to change custody despite child's preference to live with father was not
an abuse of discretion). But see Coil v. Coil, 211 Cal. App. 2d 411, 418, 27 Cal. Rptr. 378, 383 (1962)
(determining that the trial court's refusal to consider a child's preference in a custody proceeding was not an
abuse of discretion); Stack v. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d 357, 364-65, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183 (1961) (stating that
consideration of a child's preference in a custody proceeding was not required). See generally John E.
Hatherley, The Role of the Child's Wishes in California Custody Proceedings, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. RIv. 332, 333
(1973) (discussing the effect of a child's preference during the traditional adversarial custody hearing);
Lawrence A. Moskowitz, Divorce-Custody Dispositions: The Child's Wishes in Perspective, 18 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 427, 427 (1978) (explaining the various interests in a child custody proceeding and the historical
context of such custodial litigation); D.W. O'Neill, Annotation, Child's Wishes as Factor in Awarding
Custody, 4 A.L.R. 3D 1396, 1399 (1965) (examining cases that involved child custodial preferences and the
weight to be given by the court to such wishes in coming to a proper conclusion about granting custody);
Wanda E. Wakefield, Annotation, Desire of Child as to Geographical Location of Residence or Domicile as
Factor in Awarding Custody or Terminating Parental Rights, 10 A.L.R. 4TH 827, 828 (1981) (discussing cases
where the court has addressed the child's desire to remain or live in a particular location and the emphasis that
should be put on such desires within the custody determination).
2. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 765(b) (West Supp. 1994) (ordering the court during child custody
proceedings to actively guard against the unnecessary harassment or embarrassment of the child witness, and
to ensure that the questions are in a form tailored specifically to the age of the child).
3.. CAL- FAM. CODE § 3042(b) (amended by Chapter 596); see id. (dictating that the court should
control the questioning of the child in order to safeguard the best interests of the child); see also Interview with
John Myers, Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, CA (Sept. 1, 1994) (notes on file with
Pacific Law Journal) (discussing the significance of the amendment to California Family Code § 3042 and
suggesting that the use of the terms "shall control" within the statute, will place an affirmative duty on the court
to take a proactive stance in safeguarding the best interests of the child witness).
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to receive information regarding the child's custody preference through means
other than direct testimony.'
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 596 is designed to protect children from emotional damage resulting
from testifying in a court proceeding Chapter 596 accomplishes this by
authorizing courts to prevent children from being called as a witnesses in a
custody proceeding if the value of their testimony is outweighed by the possible
emotional damage."
Critics charge that the language of Chapter 596 is vague, and that it possibly
violates the "best interest standard" 7 for children Furthermore, opponents claim
4. CA. FAi. CODE § 3042(b) (amended by Chapter 596); see id. (permitting the court to deny either
party's attempt to call the child as a witness where the best interests of the child dictate otherwise); see also
Okum v. Okum, 195 Cal. App. 3d 176, 183, 240 Cal. Rptr. 458,463 (1987) (finding that there was no error
in the trial court restricting the child's testimony so that neither party could interrogate the child witness and
stating that since the court was specifically concerned with damaging the child's relationship with his parents,
there was no abuse of discretion in keeping the child's statements from the parties); Telephone Interview with
Kearse McGill, Legislative Consultant to Assemblymember Gary Hart on SB 1700 (Sept. 8. 1994) (notes on
file with the Pacific Law Journal) (noting that the phrase "providing alternative means of obtaining
information" was included to ensure that the court would have some means of obtaining information about a
child's preferences and asserting that the alternative means clause was constructed specifically so as not to
disturb the holdings which employ similar methods as that demonstrated in Okum v. Okum).
5. ASSEMBLYJUDICIARYCOMtirTEECOMmIrIrEEANALYsISOFSB 1700, at 2,4 (July 6, 1994); see
id. (noting the goal of Chapter 596 and listing support from the Family Law Section of the California State Bar,
the Joint Custody Association, and the Child Abuse Prevention Council); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COmIIrrTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1700, at 2 (June 14, 1994) (stating that the purpose of Chapter 596 is to extend
courts' authority to shield children from the pressures of testifying during a custody hearing).
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (amended by Chapter 596); see ASSE~mLY FLOOR, COMMITrE ANALYSIS
OFSB 1700, at 2 (Aug. 12, 1994) (noting the author's concern that under existing law, custody hearings are
conducted like any other form of litigation with regard to the treatment of child witnesses); SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMrrrEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1700, at 2-3 (May 10, 1994) (noting the sponsor's comments that
calling a child as a witness in a custody proceeding puts an inordinate amount of strain upon the child and
produces evidence that may have been easily obtained through other means); see also Interview with John
Myers, Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, CA (Sept. 1, 1994) (notes on file with
Pacific Law Journal) (noting that California Family Code § 3042 places more responsibility for the child's
protection on the judge than does California Evidence Code § 765(b)).
7. See CAL FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994) (listing the factors to be used in determining the best
interests of a child in custody proceedings, including: The health, safety, and welfare of the child; any history
of verified or corroborated abuse toward the child; and the type and quantity of contact between the child and
both parents); see also id. § 3021 (West 1994) (making California Family Code § 3011 applicable to custody
proceedings involving dissolutions or nullifications of marriages, legal separations, proceedings to determine
exclusive custody, and proceedings conducted pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act or the
Uniform Parentage Act); id. § 3040 (West 1994) (establishing the order of preference for determining a child's
custody); Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531,539,724 P.2d 486,491,229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (1986) (stating
that in determining child custody under the best interest standard, a holding based on a comparison between
the parent's income or economic situation was not permissible); Carney v. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 739, 598
P.2d 36, 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (1979) (asserting that in deciding upon the appropriate parent to be given
custody, the court must examine the emotional, ethical, and intellectual guidance provided by the parent to the
child during childhood).
8. ASSEmBLYJUDICIARYCOMMrrEE, COMMfIITEANALYSIS OFSB 1700, at 2 (July 6, 1994); see id.
(noting that the use of the term "harm" is undefined, and that there is no criteria established for determining
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 26
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that there is no new protection provided to children by Chapter 596 and that it
only adds confusion to child custody proceedings?
Sean P. Lafferty
Family; child support-methods of calculation
Family Code §§ 3680, 3681, 3682, 3683, 3684, 3685, 3686, 3687, 3688,
3689, 3690, 3691, 3692, 3693, 3694 (repealed); § 4068 (amended).
SB 1715 (Hart); 1994 STAT. Ch. 415
Prior law furnished a simplified child or spousal support modification process.1
Chapter 415 repeals that simplified modification process.2 Existing law authorizes
the Judicial Council to develop model worksheets and a form to provide specific
who could be the other person in the role of parent); id. at 2-3 (arguing that by emphasizing the relationship
between the child and parent, or nonparent, the best interests of the child are not necessarily being met).
9. Id. at 3 (July 6, 1994); see id. (staiing that California Evidence Code § 765(b) already provides
authority for the court to tailor the line of questioning for a child witness). But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 765(b)
(West Supp. 1994) (leaving out any provision that would authorize the court to deny either party's attempt to
call the child as a witness).
1. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 162, sec. 10, at 488-90 (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3680-3694); see
id. (enacting CAL FAM. CODE § 3680) (stating that the purpose of the article was to provide a simplified child
and spousal support modification process); id. (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 3686) (providing that the court
must take into account the age increase of the child in support modification hearings); id. (enacting CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3687) (permitting the court to increase, by a limited amount, child and spousal support without proof
of changed circumstances); id. (enacting CAL. FAm. CODE § 3688) (establishing evidentiary criteria for the
modification of support based upon the moving party's significant decrease in income); id. (enacting CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3691) (ordering the party attempting to modify child support to send a duplicate copy of notice of
motion to the district attorney's office); cf. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170(b) (Supp. 1993) (establishing that
guidelines may be considered in determining modifications of support based on a material change of
circumstances); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1(a) (Supp. 1994) (listing guidelines for determining and modifying
child support); id. § 30-304 (1993) (defining the extent of duties of support); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para.
51510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994) (providing modification of support procedures); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
403.212 (Baldwin 1989) (setting forth guidelines to be used in determining child support); id. § 403.213
(Baldwin Supp. 1993) (adding criteria for the modification of child support); MIcH. COM'. LAws ANN. § 722.3
(West 1993) (listing formula for determining child support); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-11.4(A) (Michie 1994)
(permitting modification of support upon a showing of a material and substantial change in the circumstances
of the person required to pay support); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 413(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (ordering the
court to make child support awards pursuant to the directives of this section). See generally John L. Goddard,
4 CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, Family Law Practice § 241.1 (3d ed. Supp. 1992) (discussing generally the simplified
process for modification of support orders).
2. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 415, see. 1, at 1922 (repealing CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 3680-3694); see also
ASSEBiLY JUDICIARY COM!,FEE, CoMMriEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1715, at 2 (July 6, 1994) (noting the author's
belief that the simplified modification of support process was no longer effective for parties to child support
hearings).
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information to assist courts in determining child support.' Chapter 415 mandates
that the Judicial Council consult with certain agencies, groups, and organizations
in order to create a simplified Income and Expense form for calculating child
support.
INTERPREIMV COMMENT
Chapter 415 was enacted based on recommendations by the Judicial Council
to repeal the simplified modification of support procedures, and to simplify the
Income and Expense declaration form used by the courts to determine child
support payments.
Sean P. Lafferty
Family; child support-parental income
Family Code § 5230.5 (new); § 4057.5 (amended).
SB 279 (Calderon); 1994 STAT. CH. 1140
Existing law prohibits a court from considering the income of the subsequent
spouse' or nonmarital partner of a parent who has a duty to provide child
3. CAL FAM. CODE § 4068(a) (amended by Chapter 415). See generally Goddard, supra note 1, §
241.2 (noting that Judicial Council forms approved through January 1, 1992, relating to orders for modification
of child support were contained within Appendix 3 to Chapter 1 of this text).
4. CAL FAm. CODE § 4068(b) (amended by Chapter 415); see id. (providing that the Judicial Council
must consult with the State Department of Social Services, the California Family Support Council, the Senate
and Assembly Judiciary Committees, the Family Law Section of the State Bar of California, a legal services
organization on child support issues, and custodial and noncustodial parent groups in formulating a simplified
income and expense form).
5. ASSEMBLYJUDICIARYCOMbriTEEwCOMMrFTEEANALYSISOFSB 1715, at 2 (July 6, 1994); see id.
(citing the Judicial Council's December 1993 report regarding the statewide uniform child support guideline);
see also SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSiS OF SB 1715, at 2 (May 26, 1994) (discussing the Judicial
Council's support for Chapter 415); SENATE JUDICIARY CoMmITI'EE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1715, at
2 (Apr. 19, 1994) (reporting the Judicial Council's recommendation to repeal the simplified modification of
support process); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALFORNIA, JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEaIsLATRE, at 17 (1994) (finding that the current simplified income and expense form is overly complex
for the ordinary child support hearing); id. at 22 (noting that the purpose in having uniform guidelines in
determining child support is to promote stability within the child support system and to initiate out of court
agreements between parents over child support); cf. National Child Support Reform, 1994: Hearings on H.R
4605 Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and
Means, 103rd Cong.. 2nd Sess. (1994) available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (statement of Nancy
Duff Campbell, Co-President of the National Women's Law Center) (testifying as to the need for national
child-support reform); Cheryl Wetzstein, Backing Grows for Child-Support Action; As Welfare Reform
Package Stalls, Calls Mount to Go After Deadbeats, WASH. ltIES, Aug. 21, 1994, at A4 (discussing child-
support enforcement as included with possible welfare reform legislation).
1. See CAL FAM. CODE § 11 (West 1994) (defining spouses or married persons as including persons
who are lawfully married to each other and persons who were previously lawfully married to each other, as is
appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case).
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support,2 when the court determines or modifies child support, except in an
extraordinary case? An extraordinary case under existing law occurs when a
parent voluntarily or intentionally quits work or reduces income.
Chapter 1140 provides that an extraordinary case also may include a parent
who intentionally remains unemployed or under-employed and relies on a
subsequent spouse's income.5 Chapter 1140 also asserts that if any portion of the
2. See id. § 150 (West 1994) (defining support as referring to a support obligation, including past due
support or arrearage when it exists, owing on behalf of a child, and when the term support is used with
reference to a minor child, maintenance and education are also included); id. § 4055(a)-(b) (West 1994)
(delineating the California uniform guidelines for determining child support); id. § 4056(a)-(b) (West 1994)
(listing the information to be used in determining the California uniform guideline amount for support); id. §
4057(a) (West 1994) (declaring that the amount of child support established by the formula provided in
California Family Code § 4055(a) is presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be ordered); id. §
4057(b)(l)-(5) (West 1994) (noting that the presumption of subdivision (a) of this statute is a rebuttable
presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted by admissible evidence showing that
application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case because one or more of the
following factors is found to be applicable by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court states in writing
or on the record the information required in California Family Code § 4056(a): (1) The parties have stipulated
to a different amount of child support; (2) the sale of the family residence is deferred and the rental value of
the family residence in which the children reside exceeds the mortgage payments, homeowner's insurance, and
property taxes; (3) the parent being ordered to pay child support has an extraordinarily high income and the
amount determined under the formula would exceed the needs of the children; (4) a party is not contributing
to the needs of the children at a level commensurate with that party's custodial time; or (5) application of the
formula would be unjust or inappropriate due to special circumstances in the particular case, and these special
circumstances include, but are not limited to the following cases: (A) Where the parents have different time-
sharing arrangements for different children; (B) where both parents have substantially equal time-sharing of
the children and one parent has a much lower or higher percentage of income used for housing than the other
parent; or (C) where the children have special medical or other needs that could require child support that
would be greater than the formula amount).
3. Id. § 4057.5(a)(l)-(2) (amended by Chapter 1140); see id. (stating that the income of the
obligor/obligee parent's subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner will not be considered when determining or
modifying child support, except in an extraordinary case where excluding that income would lead to extreme
and severe hardship to any child subject to the child support award, in which case the court must also consider
whether including that income would lead to extreme and severe hardship to any child supported by the
obligor/obligee or by the obligor'slobligee's subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner); id. § 4323(a)(1) (West
1994) (providing that except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, there is a rebuttable presumption,
affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is cohabitating with
a person of the opposite sex); id. (noting that upon a determination that circumstances have changed, the court
may modify or terminate the spousal support); id. § 4323(a)(2) (West 1994) (declaring that holding oneself out
to be the husband or wife of the person with whom one is cohabitating does not necessarily constitute
cohabitation); id. § 4323(b) (West 1994) (declaring that the income of a supporting spouse's subsequent spouse
or nonmarital partner will not be considered when determining or modifying spousal support). See generally
Annotation, Change in Financial Condition or Needs of Parents or Children as Ground for Modification of
Decree for Child Support Payments, 89 A.L.R.2D 7,7-103, (1963) (examining the instances in which courts
have recognized a need to modify child support payments based on altered financial conditions); Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Money Awarded as Child Support, 27 A.L.R.4TH 864, 864-1012
(1984) (illustrating cases that contest the amount of child support for families).
4. CAL. Fmi. CODE. § 4057.5(b) (amended by Chapter 1140); see id. § 4057.5(c) (amended by Chapter
1140) (stating that if any portion of the income of either parent's subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner is
allowed to be considered pursuant to this section, discovery for the purposes of determining income will be
based on W2 and 1099 income tax forms, except where the court determines that this application would be
unjust or inappropriate).
5. Id. § 4057.5(b) (amended by Chapter 1140); see 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1140, sec. 3, at 5607
(amending CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057.5) (declaring that it is the intent of the Legislature that the restrictions,
specified in California Family Code § 4075.5 on the use of a subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner's income,
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income of either parent's spouse or nonmarital partner is allowed to be considered
in relation to child support, the court must allow a hardship deduction based on
the minimum living expenses for one or more stepchildren of the party subject to
the order, and the court must comply with various statutory provisions in allowing
the deduction.6
Existing law provides for the assignment of wages to satisfy an order to pay
arrearages in child support.7 Chapter 1140 requires an obligee alleging arrearages
in child support to specify the amount thereof under penalty of perjury8
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1140 clarifies the intent of existing law designed to limit the court's
ability to consider the income of a new mate or spouse of a parent when
are not subject to judgment on a case-by-case basis, and it is also the intent of the Legislature that § 4075.5
prohibit the establishment or use of any formula or local court guideline devised to determine when
consideration of a subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner's income is relevant).
6. CAL. FAM~. CODE § 4057.5(d) (amended by Chapter 1140); see id. § 4057.5(e) (amended by Chapter
1140) (noting that the enactment of this section constitutes cause to bring an action for modification of a child
support order entered prior to the operative date of this section); see also id. § 4070 (West 1994) (stating that
if a parent is experiencing extreme financial hardship due to justifiable expenses resulting from the
circumstances enumerated in California Family Code § 4071, on the request of a party, the court may allow
income deductions under § 4059, of the same code, that may be necessary to accommodate those
circumstances); id. § 4071(aXl)-(2) (West 1994) (defining the circumstances evidencing hardship as including
the following: (1) Extraordinary health expenses for which the parent is financially responsible, and uninsured
catastrophic losses; and (2) the minimum basic living expenses of either parent's natural or adopted children
for whom the parent has the obligation to support from other marriages or relationships who reside with the
parent, and the court, on its own motion or on the request of a party, may allow these income deductions as
necessary to accommodate these expenses after making the deductions available under paragraph (I)); Id. §
4071(b) (West 1994) (providing that the maximum hardship deduction under paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
for each child who resides with the parent may be equal to, but may not exceed, the support allocated to each
child subject to the order); id. § 4071(c) (West 1994) (noting that the Judicial Council may develop tables to
reflect the maximum hardship deduction, taking into consideration the parent's net disposable income before
the hardship deduction, the number of children for whom the deduction is being given, and the number of
children for whom the support award is being made); id. § 4072(a)(l)-(2) (West 1994) (assorting that if a
deduction for hardship expenses is allowed, the court must do both of the following: (1) State the reasons
supporting the deduction in writing or on the record; and (2) document the amount of the deduction and the
underlying facts and circumstances); id. § 4072(b) (West 1994) (requiring the court to specify the duration of
the deduction whenever possible); id. § 4073 (West 1994) (stating that the court must be guided by the goals
set forth in this article when considering whether to allow a financial hardship deduction and, if allowed, when
determining the amount of the deduction).
7. Id. § 5230(a){l)-(2) (West 1994); see id. (asserting that when the court orders a party to pay an
amount for support or orders a modification of the amount of support to be paid, the court must include in its
order an earnings assignment order for support that requires the employer of the obligor to pay to the obligee
that portion of the obligoer's earnings due or to become due in the future as will be sufficient to pay an amount
to cover both of the following: (1) The amount ordered by the court for support; and (2) an amount which will
be ordered by the court to be paid toward the liquidation of any arrearage); id. § 5230(b) (West 1994) (stating
that upon the filing and service of a notice of motion or order to show cause with the supporting application,
an obligee or custodial parent receiving services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act may request the
court to issue an earnings assignment order for support to enforce a support order made or modified before July
1, 1990, including any arrearages, or to modify the support order).
8. Id. § 5230.5 (enacted by Chapter 1140).
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determining child and spousal support The author notes that some courts have
developed a uniform "hardship deduction" threshold or established a standard
definition of when an "extraordinary case" calls for imputing new mate income,
which is clearly in violation of the intent of existing law, under which a case-by-
case determination should be made.t0
Generally, statutes in other states address the situation where a parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed by referring to that party solely
without reference to any cohabitants." Prior to Chapter 1140, some nonworking
parents had tried to use legal loopholes to avoid child support payments when in
fact those parents had been enriched from the income of a new spouse or
housemate and were able to fulfill financial obligations; the efficient collection
of child support payments in general still continues to be a daunting and
frustrating task for California lawmakers.' 2
Joseph A. Tommasino
9. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY CoMhirrTEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 279, at 1-2 (July 6, 1994); 1993
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 935, sec. 2 at 4266-69 (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057.5).
10. ASSEMIBLY JuDIcIARY CoM'mIrEE, COMM=TrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 279, at 2 (July 6, 1994); see id.
(illustrating how one court, when the support ordered was below a specific amount, provided by local rule that
this constituted an "extraordinary case" for purposes of imputing new mate income, regardless of the income
of the parties or any balance of hardships).
11. For examples of other state statutes which discuss parental income and child support calculations,
see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(7)(a)(Ifl)(b)(I) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that if a parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, child support will be calculated based on a determination of
potential income, except that a determination of potential income will not be made for a parent who is
physically or mentally incapacitated or is caring for a child two years of age or younger for whom the parents
are jointly responsible); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(d) (Baldwin 1993) (stating that potential income
will be determined based upon employment potential and probable earnings levels based on the obligoer's recent
work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing job opportunities and earning levels in the
community); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (West 1991) (asserting that if a party is voluntarily unemployed
or underemployed, child support will be calculated based on a determination of his or her income earning
potential, unless the party is physically or mentally incapacitated, or is caring for a child of the parties under
the age of five years).
12. Dana Wilkie, Child-support Take is Up, but So Is Demand, SAN DIEGo UNION-TRm., Aug. 1, 1993,
at A-I; see id. (reporting that in 1992, the State's independent legislative analyst ranked California 31st in the
nation in its efforts to collect child support, and an earlier survey by the House Ways and Means Committee
was more disturbing in its ranking of California as 48th of 50 states); see also Harry D. Krause, Child Support
Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 367, 367 (arguing
that the child support obligation in America today reflects some disturbing trends and tensions between the
following elements: (1) Society's continuing need for a functioning family infrastructure; (2) this generation's
emphasis on individual's rights; (3) traditional financial responsibility for dependents such as the spouse and
children; and (4) the care-giving capacity of the one-parent family). See generally Mary Jo Bane & David T.
Ellwood, Is American Business Working for the Poor?, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept. 1991, at 58 (advocating the
view that by collecting child support through automatic wage withholding by employers, reliable payments
would be insured which are the least vulnerable to noncompliance or fraud).
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Family; dependent children-notification of rights
Welfare and Institutions Code § 353.1 -(new).
AB 1013 (Murray); 1994 STAT. Ch. 159
Under existing law, a juvenile court can find a minor to be a dependent child'
of the court for a prescribed cause.2 Furthermore, existing law authorizes a
dependent child, through a guardian, to petition the juvenile court to change,
modify, or set aside any order of the juvenile court previously made, or to
terminate the jurisdiction of the court
Chapter 159 requires the juvenile court to inform a dependent child who is at
least twelve years of age, and the guardian ad litem4 or the legal counsel5 of a
1. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a)-) (West Supp. 1994) (providing a means for determining
which juveniles will be classified as dependent children); see also id. § 325 (West 1984) (requiring a probation
officer to first file a petition with the court to commence the proceedings in which a minor will be declared a
dependent child of the court).
2. Id. § 3000) (West Supp. 1994); see id. (indicating that the intent of the Legislature in enacting
California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 was to provide maximum protection for children who are being
physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, neglected, or exploited; to protect children who are at risk of that
harm; and to preserve the family whenever possible in the minor's best interest); see also id, § 202(d) (West
Supp. 1994) (declaring that the purpose of thejuvenile courts and other public agencies is to consider the safety
and protection of the public and the best interests of the minor); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5601(a) (West Supp. 1994)
(presenting the Congressional findings that at present, juvenile courts, foster and protective care programs, and
shelter facilities are inadequate to meet the needs of children, who, because of the failure of these services, run
the risk of becoming future delinquents and burdening the adult court system); id. § 5601(a)(1 1)-(12) (West
Supp. 1994) (declaring that emphasis should be placed on preventing youths from entering the juvenile justice
system in the first place and reducing delinquency by providing public recreation programs and activities
designed to provide social skills, enhance self esteem, and encourage constructive use of the minor's time).
See generally In re Walker, 159 Cal. App. 2d 463, 468, 324 P.2d 32,35 (1958) (holding that the child's welfare
is of paramount consideration in the juvenile court system).
3. CAL WELF. & INsT. CODE § 388 (West 1984); see id. (permitting the minor to make the stated
motions upon the grounds of a change in circumstances or new evidence presented to the court); id. (allowing
the motions to also be made by a person in the best interests of the child once the relationship of such person
to the child has been determined); see also Ansley v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 477, 481,229 Cal. Rptr.
771, 776 (1986) (upholding the requirement for new evidence with a showing of the absence ofjurisdictional
notice necessary to support a dependency judgment as an appropriate ground for setting aside a judicial order);
cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-13 (West 1979) (describing the procedure for a delinquent juvenile court
proceeding and detailing the rights to which the child is entitled); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Anderson
Supp. 1994) (describing the juvenile court procedure for detention hearings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109
(West Supp. 1994) (detailing the procedure for questioning children and appointing guardians and counsel for
the juvenile court procedure); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.100 (West Supp. 1994) (relating the procedure
for appointing guardians ad litem and counsel for a child); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.21 (West 1937) (describing
the rights of dependent children in the juvenile court system).
4. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 356.5 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that a child advocate
appointed by the court shall have the same duties and responsibilities as a guardian ad litem). See generally
Nancy Neraas, Comment, The Non-Lawyer Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: The
King County, Washington, Experience, 58 WASH. L. REv. 853, 853-55 (1983) (providing a general description
of the role and function of the guardian ad litem in dependent child jurisdiction cases before ajuvenile court
in Washington).
5. See CAL WapF. & INST. CODE § 356.5 (West Supp. 1994) (declaring that a child has the right to
representation by counsel); see also id. § 317 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring the court to appoint counsel to
represent the child when the child cannot afford counsel); Akkiko M. v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 525,
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child who has not yet reached twelve years of age, both verbally and in writing,
of the child's right to petition the court.6
In addition, Chapter 159 requires the court to inform the guardian or the
counsel, depending upon the child's age, of the availability of all appropriate and
necessary Judicial Council forms.7 If the child is twelve years of age or older, the
court must directly inform the child of these provisions in clear language
appropriate for the child's level of cognitive learning.8 If the child is under twelve
years of age, the court must inform the child through the child's guardian ad litem
or legal counsel.9
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
AB 1013 was originally intended to codify a bill of rights for foster care
children in order to ensure that their needs and interests are addressed by the
foster care system.'0 However, opposition strongly believed that the bill would
adversely affect the system since the standards were considered too strict and not
likely to assist the dependent children at all."
AB 1013 was amended to only require the informing of dependent children of
their rights.12 However, opponents continue to believe that the law is largely
530, 209 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1985) (upholding California Welfare and Institutions Code § 318 by requiring
the court to appoint counsel and to allow counsel to continue to represent the minor unless relieved by the court
upon substitution of other counsel or for other cause).
6. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 353.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 159).
7. Id. § 353.1 (a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 159); AssEMBLY F.)oR, COMmrrrE ANALYSiS OF AB 1013,
at 2 (Jan. 31, 1994) (stating that the costs attributed to the provision of the bill relating to the Judicial Council
forms and the minimal reimbursable costs for the notification procedures are approximately $20,000).
8. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 353.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 159); see In re Raymundo B., 203 Cal.
App. 3d 1447, 1454, 250 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1988) (holding that the burden is on the minor to prove a level
of comprehension or that he or she does not understand the English language and requires an interpreter).
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 353.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 159).
10. A.B. 1013, 1993-1994 Calif. Reg. Sess. § 1 (Mar. 1, 1993); see ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITIEE,
COMMIrEr ANALYSIS OF AB 1013, at 3 (Jan. 24, 1994); id. (stating that the original intent of the bill was to
create a children's bill of rights providing the right to humane care and the right to ethical conduct by all
persons responsible for their care); id. at 3-4 (indicating the author's belief that foster children are in need of
a means to assert their rights due to their vulnerable position in the system and that AB 1013 would provide
the chance for these children to communicate their problems and assert their rights before they run away or take
drastic measures); cf Robert B. Gunnison & Teresa Moore, S.F. Foster Care Called Worst in California
Scathing Report Prompts State to Order Probe into 3,600 Cases, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1994, at Al (providing
a detailed look at the decaying child welfare agencies which are over-booked, under-staffed, and virtually
ineffective in protecting a child's welfare); Davan Maharaj, Plight of Children Worsens Despite Affluence of
O.C, L.A. ThiEs, May 14, 1993, at Al (stating that the number of cases of child abuse, neglect, and children
living in poverty are at all-time high levels); Debra J. Saunders, Nitpicking, Really, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 1993,
at A18 (relating how children virtually have no rights at all concerning their welfare and that courts are more
likely to award custody to abusive, unstable parents than to stable relatives or friends).
11. ASEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMnT-EE, COhmTrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1013, at 4 (Jan. 24,1994); see
iU (indicating that the California Society for Clinical Social Work opposes the bill because it believes that no
foster parent, or even biological parent, can undertake the responsibility of raising a child under the
circumstances of the bill).
12. AB 1013, 1993-1994 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. § 1 (Mar. 16, 1994); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
353.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 159).
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redundant, and that minors are already notified of their rights through their
guardians or legal counsel.'" Despite opposition to the law, Chapter 159
ultimately ensures that dependent children will have their opportunity to voice
their concerns and assert their rights to the juvenile court. 4
Anthony J. Enciso
Family; domestic violence-statewide registration of protective orders
Family Code § 6380 (repealed and new); §§ 6381, 6383, 6385 (amended);
Penal Code § 12028.5 (amended).
AB 3034 (Solis); 1994 STAT. Ch. 872
Prior law required certain procedural steps to be taken by the petitioner or the
attorney for the petitioner to notify relevant law enforcement agencies of the
issuance of a protective order.' Chapter 872 requires counties to implement a
13. SENATE FLOOR, COMMnTEEANALYSIS OFAB 1013, at 2 (June 15, 1994); see id. (stating that the
intent of AB 1013 is to ensure that children who are dependents of the juvenile courts are informed of their
rights to petition the court, as specified, under existing law); iaL (stating that opponents, such as Juvenile Court
Judges of California, believe AB 1013 is redundant since counsel or a guardian would inform the child of these
rights initially); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 353 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring the judge or clerk, at
the beginning of a hearing of dependency, to read the petition to those present, and afterward, upon request,
the judge is to explain any term of the allegations, the nature of the hearing, its procedure, and possible
consequences); cf. Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judicial
Proceedings, 18 PEP?. L. REv. 255, 257-62 (1991) (describing the various procedures enabling the child's
wishes and intentions to be represented through appointed counsel or a guardian ad litem). See generally FED.
R. Civ. P. 17(c) (directing a federal court to appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant who is not otherwise
represented in the action); CAL. CT. R. 1412 (setting forth the various rights available to a dependent child in
the juvenile court system).
14. ASSMBLY FLOOR, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1013, at 2 (June 20,1994); see also CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 353.1(a)(1)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 159); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring that one
will not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law); CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 7(a),
15 (providing that the state will not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process).
1. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 219, sec. 154 at 1389 (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 6380) (requiring that
a copy of the protective order and proof of service to respondent be mailed or delivered by petitioner, attorney
of the petitioner, or the county clerk, by the close of the business day when the order was issued, to law
enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over the residence of the petitioner or the residence of a party with
care, control, or custody of a child who is to be protected from domestic violence, and other locations where
domestic violence against the petitioner or other protected parties is likely to occur); see also CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6218 (West 1994) (defining protective order as a restraining order enjoining the respondent from committing
specific acts of abuse, entering a specified dwelling, or other specified behavior). See generally I1 B.E.
Wr7mu, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Husband and Wife, § 36J (9th ed. Supp. 1994) (discussing the
procedures for transmission of protective orders to law enforcement agencies, and service of the protective
order to the respondent).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 26
Family
system whereby the state Department of Justice 2 will be notified electronically of
all issuances, modifications, extensions, or terminations of protective orders?
Upon the issuance of a protective order, certain information will be transmitted
electronically to the Department of Justice 4 Chapter 872 also requires the
establishment of a Domestic Violence Protective Order Registry maintained by
the Department of Justice.5 Chapter 872 also requires that certain materials be
made available at local courts to assist victims of domestic violence.6
Existing law provides that a protective order can be enforced by a law
enforcement agency of a political subdivision only if the agency has received a
copy of the order.7 Chapter 872 allows law enforcement agencies to enforce
protective orders that they have received electronically.8
Prior law provided certain procedures for service of a protective order by a law
enforcement officer.9 Chapter 872 requires a law enforcement officer to orally
notify the respondent of the existence of a protective order at the scene of a
domestic violence incident."0
Existing law allows certain law enforcement officials to take custody of
firearms u or other deadly weapons 12 present at the scene of a family violence
2. See CAL GOv'T CODE § 15001 (West 1992) (providing that the Department of Justice is composed
of the Office of the Attorney General and the Division of Law Enforcement).
3. CAL FAM. CODE § 6380 (a),(f),(h) (enacted by Chapter 872); see id. (providing that the existing
California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) of the Department of Justice be used for
the transmission of protective orders and their modification, extension, or termination).
4. Id. § 6380(b) (enacted by Chapter 872); see id. (requiring transmission of: (1) The description of
the respondent; (2) the names of the protected persons; (3) the date of the order; (4) the duration of the order,
(5) the terms and conditions of the order, (6) the department or division number and address of the court; and
(7) whether the order was served on the respondent); id. § 6380(c) (enacted by Chapter 872) (requiring that
the information conveyed to the Department of Justice will also indicate whether the respondent was present
in court to be informed of the order). The respondent's presence in court will constitute proof of service of
notice of the terms of the protective order. Id.
5. Id. § 6380(e) (enacted by Chapter 872); see id. (requiring that all information regarding domestic
violence restraining orders be available to clerks of the court and to appropriate law enforcement personnel).
6. Id. § 6380(g) (enacted by Chapter 872); see id. (requiring the Judicial Council to assist local courts
in developing informational packets to assist those seeking domestic violence protective orders, including
descriptions of procedures and maps to help locate filing windows and appropriate courts).
7. Id. § 6381(b) (amended by Chapter 872).
8. Id.
9. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 219, sec. 154, at 1390 (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 6383); see id.
(allowing an officer to serve on the respondent a copy of a protective order when at the scene of reported
domestic violence).
10. CAL FAM. CODE § 6383(e) (amended by Chapter 872); see id. (providing that when an officer
determines that a protective order has been issued but not served, the officer's verbal notification to the
respondent of the existence of the order constitutes sufficient notice); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HoFsTRA L. REv. 801, 1006-15 (1993) (discussing the role of law enforcement in preventing domestic
violence). For other state statutes concerning transmission and notification of protective orders see CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West Supp. 1994); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.17 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-12 (Supp. 1994).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (West 1992) (defining a firearm as any device, designed to be
used as a weapon, from which is expelled through a barrel a projectile by the force of any explosion or other
form of combustion).
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incident involving a threat to human life or physical assault, as necessary for the
protection of the law enforcement official or other persons at the scene.' 3 Under
Chapter 872, members of the California Highway Patrol are granted this
authority.
14
Existing law provides immunity from civil liability to law enforcement or
Department of Justice officials, when a person who is the subject of a protective
order is able to purchase or receive a firearm due to the failure of a court to
provide a required notification, and another person is injured.' 5 Chapter 872
extends this immunity to employees of a court.'
6
NTERPRETVE COMMENT
Chapter 872 was enacted in order to ensure rapid entry of restraining order
information into the state Department of Justice's Domestic Violence Protective
Order Registry. 17 Chapter 872 was also enacted to make the process of applying
for a restraining order less confusing during a time that is often exceedingly
stressful. 8 This is accomplished by the distribution of informational packets to
the courts.' 9
Johnnie B. Beer
12. See id. § 12028.5(a)(4) (amended by Chapter 872) (defining deadly weapons as weapons, the
possession or concealed carrying of which is prohibited by California Penal Code § 12020).
13. Id. § 12028.5(b) (amended by Chapter 872); see id. (defining law enforcement officials with the
authority to remove firearms from the scene of a domestic violence incident as sheriffs, undersheriffs, deputy
sheriffs, marshals, deputy marshals, city police officers, members of the University of California Police
Department, deputized or appointed personnel as defined in California Penal Code § 830.6, members of the
California State University Police Department, peace officers of the Department of Parks and Recreations,
housing authority patrol officers, and parole and probation officers); id. (requiring that the firearm or deadly
weapon be discovered in plain sight or as the result of a consensual search).
14. Id; see CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 2250-2269 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (defining the membership,
requirements, and duties of the California Highway Patrol).
15. Id. § 6385(d) (amended by Chapter 872); see also CAL PENAL CODE § 12021(g) (West Supp. 1994)
(imposing criminal penalties for the acquisition of a firearm while subject to a protective order).
16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6385(d) (amended by Chapter 872).
17. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY ComMrTEE, COMMrrTEE ANALYsIs OF AB 3034, at 3 (Apr. 20, 1994); see
id. (noting that immediate transmission protects the petitioner in case the copy of the order or the proof of
service is lost).
18. SENATs FLOoR, COMMrT ANALYSiS oFAB 3034, at 4 (Aug. 12, 1994).
19. Id.
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Family; elder abuse-provisional reorganization
Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 15610, 15610.1, 15620, 15620.5, 15630,
15631, 15632, 15633, 15633.5, 15635, 15640, 15650 (repealed); §§ 15610,
15610.05, 15610.07, 15610.10, 15610.13, 15610.15, 15610.17, 15610.20,
15610.23, 15610.25, 15610.27, 15610.30, 15610.35, 15610.37, 15610.40,
15610.43, 15610.45, 15610.47, 15610.50, 15610.53, 15610.55, 15610.57,
15610.60, 15610.63, 15610.65, 15630, 15631, 15632, 15633, 15633.5,
15636, 15640, 15650, 15653, 15654, 15656, 15658, 15659 (new); § 15600
(amended).
SB 1681 (Mello); 1994 STAT. Ch. 594
Under existing law, any care custodian,' health practitioner,2 or employee of
a county adult protective services agency 3 or a local law enforcement agency4 that
reasonably suspects an elder6 or dependent adult7 is being abused must report
their suspicions to the appropriate agency! Chapter 594 expands the definition
1. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining care custodian).
2. See id. § 15610.37 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining health practitioner).
3. See id. § 15610.13 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining adult protective services agency); see also
Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse and the States' Adult Protective Services Response: Time for a Change
in California, 42 HWSTINS LJ. 861,869 (1990-1991) (stating that adult protective services "are traditionally
defined as a system of preventative, supportive, and surrogate services for the elderly living in the community
to enable then to maintain independent living and avoid abuse and exploitation" (quoting John J. Regan,
Intervention Through Adult Protective Services Programs, 18 GERONTOLOGIST 250, 251 (1978))).
4. See CAL WEiF. & INST. CODE § 15610.45 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining local law enforcement
agency).
5. See id. § 15610.65 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining reasonable suspicion).
6. See it § 15610.27 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining elder as any person residing in this state, 65
years of age or older).
7. See id. § 15610.23 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining dependent adult as any person residing in
this state between the ages of 18 and 64 years, who has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her
ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights including, but not limited to, persons who
have physical or developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have diminished because of
age).
8. Id. § 15630(b) (enacted by Chapter 594); 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 241, sec. 1, at 1199-1201
(amending CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630); see CAL WE.F. & INsT. CODE § 15610.07 (enacted by Chapter
594) (defining abuse of an elder or dependent adult as physical abuse, neglect, fiduciary abuse, abandonment,
isolation, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering, or the deprivation by a
care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering); see also id.
§ 15610.30 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining fiduciary abuse as a situation in which any person who has the
care or custody of, or who stands in a position of trust to, an elder or a dependent adult, takes, secretes, or
appropriates their money or property, to any use or purposes not in the due and lawful execution of his or her
trust); id. § 15610.43 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining isolation); id. § 15610.53 (enacted by Chapter 594)
(defining mental suffering as fear, agitation, confusion, severe depression, or other forms of serious emotional
distress that is brought about by threats, harassment, or other forms of intimidating behavior); id. § 15610.57
(enacted by Chapter 594) (defining neglect); id. § 15610.63 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining physical
abuse); Peter J. Strauss, Before Guardianship: Abuse of Patient Rights Behind Closed Doors, 41 EMORY L.J.
761,764-66 (1992) (indicating that systems protecting the patient crumble when interests exist that are separate
from those of the patient); Judy Foreman, Millions of Elder Americans Live in Fear of Abuse; Aging, BosTON
GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1994, at43 (listing the indications of abuse); cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3901 (1985); ILL.
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of care custodian to include members or support staff of independent living
centers, clients rights advocates,9 court investigators, Alzheimer's Disease Day
Care Resource Centers, vocational rehabilitations facilities, or any other private
assistance agencies that provide health services or social services to elders or
dependent adults.'0
Under prior law, all reports by any care custodian or health practitioner of
abuse or suspected abuse were made to the county adult protective services
agency or the local law enforcement agency." Under Chapter 594, if abuse has
occurred in a long-term care facility,'2 with the exception of a state mental health
hospital or a state developmental center, the report will be made to the local long-
term care ombudsman 3 or the local law enforcement agency.'4 However, if the
abuse occurred in a state mental health hospital or a state developmental center,
the report will be made to an investigator of the State Department of Mental
Health, 5 the State Department of Developmental Services, 6 or the local law
enforcement agency.' 7 If the abuse has not occurred in either of the instances cited
above, then the abuse will be reported to a county adult protective services agency
or the local law enforcement agency'8
Prior law required the ombudsman coordinator to report to the county adult
protective services agency, who then reported monthly to the State Department
of Social Services. 9 Under Chapter 594 the ombudsman program now reports
monthly to the Department of Aging,2" and the Department of Aging reports
quarterly to the State Department of Social Services.2'
ANN. STAT. Ch. 320 para. 20/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.180 (Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 52-3-802 (1993) (providing for the protection of elderly and/or dependent adults).
9. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.20 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining client's rights
advocate as the individual or individuals assigned by a regional center of state hospital developmental center
to be responsible for clients' rights assurance for persons with developmental disabilities).
10. Id. § 15610.17 (enacted by Chapter 594).
11. 1990 Cal. Legis Serv. ch. 241, sec. 1, at 1199-1201 (amending CAL VY. & INST. CODE § 15630).
12. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.47 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining long-term care
facility).
13. See id. § 15610.50 (enacted by Chapter 594) (defining long-term care ombudsman as the State
Long-Term Care Ombudsman, local ombudsman coordinators, and other persons currently certified as
ombudsman by the Department of Aging); see also CAL EDUC. CODE §§ 9700-9719.5 (West 1984 & Supp.
1994) (defining the duties and responsibilities in the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program).
14. CAL. WELU. & INST. CODE § 15630(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 594).
15. See id. §§ 4000-4091 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994) (defining the duties and responsibilities of the
State Department of Mental Health).
16. See id. §§ 4400-4474 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994) (defining the duties and responsibilities of the
State Department of Developmental Services).
17. Id. § 15630(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 594).
18. Id. § 15630(b)(3) (enacted by Chapter 594).
19. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 241, sec. 1, at 1199-1201 (amending CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630);
see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10550-10618 (West 1984) (defining the duties and responsibilities of
the State Department of Social Services).
20. See CAL WE.F. & INST. CODE §§ 9300-93 10 (Vest 1984) (defining the duties and responsibilities
of the Department of Aging).
21. Id. § 15658(c) (enacted by Chapter 594).
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Existing law provides specific situations in which confidential information
regarding elder abuse may be revealed. 22 Chapter 594 expands this provision to
include situations between members of a multidisciplinary team. Chapter 594
also provides for the exchange of information between agencies that had referred
or reported abuse to the county adult protective services agency, long-term care
ombudsman program, or local law enforcement agency who conducted the
investigation.24
Prior law required the State Department of Social Services to consult with the
State Department of Education in the development of reporting forms.O Chapter
594 repeals this provision and now makes it mandatory that the Department of
Social Services consult with various other agencies in the development of forms.27
Chapter 594 also makes it a crime for any person to: (1) Cause a dependent
adult to suffer; (2) inflict unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a
dependent adult; (3) willfully cause or permit the elder or dependent adult to be
injured where the person is responsible for the adult's care or custody; or (4)
cause or permit the elder or dependent adult to be placed in a situation that
endangers his or her person or health.28 In addition, Chapter 594 makes it a
misdemeanor for any person who is mandated to report an instance or suspected
instance of abuse and does not do so.29
22. Id. § 15633(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 594); see id. (allowing reports of suspected elder or
dependent adult abuse and information to be disclosed to certain persons or agencies only where the
information is relevant to the incident of abuse); see also id. § 15633.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 594)
(elaborating on the definition of persons and agencies upon which information may be given as investigators
from an adult protective services agency, a local law enforcement agency, or the bureau of Medi-Cal Fraud
which is investigating a known or suspected case of elder or dependent adult abuse).
23. Id. § 15633(b)(2)(A)-(B) (enacted by Chapter 594); see id. § 15610.55 (enacted by Chapter 594)
(defining multidisciplinary team).
24. Id. § 15640(t) (enacted by Chapter 594).
25. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 33300-33319.5 (West 1993) (defining the duties and responsibilities of
the State Department of Education).
26. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 241, sec. 1, at 1191-1201 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15633).
27. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15658(a) (enacted by Chapter 594); see id. (listing the various agencies
as the Department of Aging, the State Department of Developmental Services, the State Department of Mental
Health, the Bureau of Medi-Cal Fraud, professional medical and nursing agencies, hospital associations, and
county welfare departments).
28. Id. § 15656 (enacted by Chapter 594); see id. § 15656(e) (enacted by Chapter 594) (exempting any
person found neglectful under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.57(b) from prosecution); see
also id. § 15610.57(b) (enacted by Chapter 594) (stating that no person shall be considered neglected or abused
for the sole reason that he or she relied voluntarily on treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in lieu
of medical treatment); cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 368(a),(b) (West 1984) (providing that a person who has
inflicted pain or mental suffering or endangered the health of an elder or dependent adult may be charged with
an alternate felony/misdemeanor); People v. Heitzman, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1047, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 199, 203
(1993) (holding that a daughter had the duty to care for her father and was criminally liable for his death under
the California Penal Code), review granted 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389; People v. Manis, 10 Cal. App. 4th 110, 115-
17, 12 Cal. Rptr 2d 619, 622-23 (1992) (holding that California Penal Code § 368 is not unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, and does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution),
review denied. 1993 Cal. LEXIS 718 (1993).
29. CAL WEF. & INsT. CODE § 15630(g) (enacted by Chapter 594); see id. (providing that a violation
of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by not more than six months in the county jail or by a fine of not
more than $1000, or by both that fine and imprisonment).
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INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
In 1990, thirty-one million adults were over the age of sixty-five." This
number is expected to grow to thirty-five million by the year 2000."t Although
statistics are relatively scarce regarding elder abuse, 2 it is estimated that the
number of elder or dependent abuse victims in the nation is one to two million a
year.33 Chapter 594 was enacted to respond to this growing rate of abuse?4 In
doing so, Chapter 594 also reorganizes the elder and dependent adult abuse
provisions to decrease confusion and ease interpretation
Chapter 594's provision regarding confidentiality helps to prevent, identify,
and treat persons that are victims of such elder or dependent abuse.36 However,
Chapter 594 is not free from problems; namely, concerns regarding the elderly's
30. Garfield, supra note 3, at 862.
31. Id.
32. See Christine A. Metcalf, A Response to the Problem of Elder Abuse: Florida's Revised Adult
Protective Services Act, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv 745, 746 (1986-87) (stating that generalizations from existing
data are troublesome because state definitions of abuse and of those who need protective services differ); see
also Sandra Guthans, Information on Abuse of Elderly is Obscure, TIMES-PICAYUNP, May 22, 1994, at 2AI
(indicating that family violence studies frequently do not distinguish between victims that are elderly and
victims of spousal abuse).
33. Foreman, supra note 8; see also Strauss, supra note 8 (quoting Patricia A. Young, Home-Care
Characteristics that Shape the Exercise of Autonomy, GENERATIONS, Supp. 1990, at 17-19) (stating that elderly
family members rarely will admit that abuse is happening because of their dependency and the natural bond
linking parent and child); Theresa Tighe, Abused Elders Can Get Help but Often Are Afraid, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1994, at ID (stating that statistics from Missouri and Illinois demonstrates that the most
common victim of abuse is the white widow and the most common abuser is the victim's child); Violence
Against Older Women on the Increase, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., June 6, 1994, at E2 (indicating that women
make up 59% of the elderly population and 75% of the elder abuse victims); cf. Jan E. Rein, Preserving Dignity
and Self-Determination of the Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal
for Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1818, 1853 (1992) (explaining that caregiving is
a stressful and demanding job for which most caregivers are unequipped to handle properly (quoting Jane
Clifford, Parents Helping Their Parents, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1, 1990, DI, D4)); Michael Schuster, Board
and Care; How Effective Are Licensing Standards?, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Oct. 1993, at 600, 605 (stating that
the most at-risk elderly and disabled adults live in board and care homes); id. at 604 (indicating that 28,000
board and care homes are unlicensed); id. at 600 (defining board and care as nonmedical community-based
living arrangements that provide shelter, board, 24-hour supervision or protective oversight, and personal care
services to residents (not related to the operator) (quoting American Association of Retired Persons, The
Regulation of Board and Care Homes: The Result ofa Survey in the 50 States and The District of Columbia
3 (1993))). Contra Neil Gilbert, Miscounting Social Ills; Politically-Motivated Social Science Research; Fraud
in Research, SOCIETY, Mar. 1994, at 18 passim (stating that policy considerations have become muddled due
to extrapolations of research and indicating that the figures reported are not entirely accurate).
34. SENATE JutDIcARY CoMMrrrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1681, at 2 (Apr. 4, 1994); see also
Sandra Guthans, Program Targets Elder Abuse, Neglect, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 16, 1994, at 7BI
(demonstrating other programs that are designed to help identify and report abuse such as the Gatekeepers
Program in New Orleans, LA., originating from Spokane, WA., where non-traditional sources make referrals
to the Elderly Protective Services). These businesses include a regional transit authority, fire department, bank,
and ambulance service. Id.
35. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1681, at 2 (Apr. 4, 1994).
36. Id; see id. (indicating that persons who are trained and qualified to serve on a multidisciplinary team
can disclose information and records that are relevant to the prevention, identification, or treatment of abuse
of elderly or dependent persons).
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right to self-determination that arises whenever the treatment of abuse is
mandated. 7
Marnie L Smith
Family; relative caregiver's rights-medical care authorization
Family Code §§ 6550, 6552 (new); Education Code § 48204 (amended).
SB 592 (Russell); 1994 STAT. Ch. 98
Existing law creates a mechanism for establishing the guardianship of a minor.'
Chapter 98 provides for a caregiver's authorization affidavit that allows a
caregiver eighteen years of age or older to enroll a minor in school, consent to
school-related medical care2 and, where the caregiver is a relative3 , give the
caregiver the general power to consent to and authorize medical and dental care
as specified.4
37. Laurie A. Lewis, Toward Eliminating the Abuse, Neglect, and Erploilation of ImpairedAdults: The
District of Columbia Adult Protective Services Act of 1984, 35 CAm. U. L. REv. 1193, 1197 (1986); see id.
(emphasizing that elderly individuals' right to self-determination should not be overlooked because of age);
see also Katheryn D. Katz, ElderAbuse, 18 J. FAM. L. 695, 719 (1979-80) (explaining that adults who have
refused the services of a protective agency may find themselves in an incompetency hearing where the refusal
of services proves lack of capacity to manage their own affairs and indicating that even if an adult voluntarily
accepts the services, he or she may still find herself or himself removed from his or her home and
institutionalized).
1. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510 (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 1510(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that
a relative or other person on behalf of the minor, or the minor if 12 years of age or older, may file a petition
for the appointment of a guardian of the minor); see also id. § 1513(a) (West Supp. 1994) (suggesting that a
court investigator, probation officer, or domestic relations investigator may make an investigation and
recommendation concerning each proposed guardianship); id. § 1514(a) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that the
court may appoint a guardian for the minor if it appears necessary and convenient); Guardianship of Pankey,
38 Cal. App. 3d 919, 927, 113 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1974) (stating that the issue of whether it is necessary and
convenient to appoint a guardian of a minor who has a parent living is complex, but the crucial criterion is the
best interests of the child, and a court should not be slow to recognize those who in good faith seek to assist
the court in its decisions); In re Levy, 137 Cal. App. 2d 237, 247, 290 P.2d 320, 327 (1955) (stating that the
cardinal consideration governing the court in its appointment of a guardian is how to serve most effectively
the best interests and temporal, moral, and mental welfare of the child).
2. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 6550(i)(3) (enacted by Chapter 98) (defining school-related medical care
as medical care for pupils that is required by a state or local governmental authority as a condition for school
enrollment, including immunizations, physical examinations, and medical examinations conducted in schools).
3. See id. § 6550(i)(2) (enacted by Chapter 98) (defining relative as a spouse, parent, stepparent,
brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, first cousin, or any
person denoted by the prefix "grand" or "great," or the spouse of any of the persons specified in this definition,
even after the marriage has been terminated by death or dissolution).
4. Id. § 6550(a) (enacted by Chapter 98); see id. (eliminating the need for a guardianship to enable a
relative caregiver to authorize the provision of medical and dental care to the minor child living with the
relative caregiver); id. § 6550(b) (enacted by Chapter 98) (noting that the caregiver's affidavit will not be valid
for more than one year after the date on which it was executed); id. § 6550(c) (enacted by Chapter 98) (adding
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Chapter 98 also declares that no person who acts in good faith reliance on a
caregiver's authorization affidavit to provide medical or dental care without actual
knowledge of facts contrary to those stated on the affidavit is subject to any
criminal or civil penalties or any professional disciplinary action for such
reliance.5 Chapter 98 provides a form of the caregiver's affidavit to be signed
under penalty of perjury, and the affidavit is valid for up to one year after the date
on which it is executed.6
Existing law lists the various circumstances under which a pupil is deemed to
comply with the residency requirements for school attendance in a school
district.7 Chapter 98 mandates that the home of a relative caregiver also meets the
various requirements for compliance.8
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Under Chapter 98, a nonjudicial process has been created by which "relative
caregivers" have authorization to provide for the schooling or medical care of a
minor child without affecting the parental rights of the child's parents! Chapter
that the decision of a caregiver to consent to or refuse medical or dental treatment for a minor will be
superseded by any contravening decision of the parent or other person having legal custody of the minor,
provided the decision of the parent or legal custodian of the minor does not jeopardize the life, health, or safety
of the minor).
5. Id. § 6550(d) (enacted by Chapter 98); see id. (stating that even if medical or dental care is provided
to a minor in contravention of the wishes of the parent or other person having legal custody of the minor, a lack
of actual knowledge of that person's wishes prevents the caregiver from facing liability).
6. Id. §§ 6550(b), 6552 (enacted by Chapter 98).
7. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48204 (amended by Chapter 98); see id. § 48204(a)-(c), (e)-(f) (amended by
Chapter 98) (allowing compliance under the following circumstances: (1) When a pupil is one who is placed
within the boundaries of the school district in a regularly established licensed children's institution, or a
licensed foster home, or a family home pursuant to a commitment or placement; (2) when a pupil is one for
whom interdistrict attendance has been approved; (3) when a pupil is one whose residence is located within
the boundaries of the school district and whose parent or legal guardian is relieved of responsibility, control,
and authority over the minor through emancipation; (4) when a pupil is one whose parent or legal guardian has
established the residence of the pupil in a home located in the boundaries of that school district, provided that
home is properly licensed if licensure is required by law; (5) when a pupil is one who resides in a state hospital
within the boundaries of the school district; and (6) when an elementary school pupil has one or both parents,
or a legal guardian, who is employed within the boundaries of the school district).
8. Id. § 48204(d) (amended by Chapter 98).
9. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6550(a) (enacted by Chapter 98); see SENATE RULES CoMhMrE, ComrtrrEE
ANALYsIs oFSB 592, at 3 (June 8, 1993) (stating that SB 592 will make it easier for minors to get the medical
care they need, since the current guardianship system is time-consuming and costly for both relatives and the
courts); Jennifer Cohen, Guardians of the Grandkids-The Crack Epidemic and Other Social Problems Have
Prompted an Increase in Grandparent Guardianships-A Solution to Taking Care of Kids That's Fraught with
Its Own Problems, THE RECORDER, July 15, 1993, at I (discussing the plight of grandparent guardians who,
unlike non-family caregivers, are not eligible for state foster-care money or programs aimed at training
caregivers in how to deal with the physical or emotional problems of minors); Andrew Fegelman, Morn with
AIDS Seeks Precedent-She Would Like a Guardian-in-Waiting for Her 2 Children, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1993,
at Chicagoland 3 (stating that with a terminally ill patient, no guardian can be appointed until the death of the
parent, and the appointment procedure usually takes a month, during which time the child can have difficulties
receiving medical care); Guardian Denied in AIDS case-Court Rejects Mom's Request to Appoint Standby
Parent, CHI. TRW., Feb. 2, 1993, at Chicagoland 3 (reporting that the court refused to appoint a standby
guardian for a mother with AIDS, preferring to wait for the Legislature to initiate the new law); see also
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98 also provides that a child is a resident of a school district if the home of the
caregiver is in the district.'" According to the author of Chapter 98, the new law
will lighten the burden carried by thousands of relatives in California who are
raising children left in their care, by establishing a simple procedure to allow
them to authorize needed medical care and to enroll the children in school; many
relative caregivers had been told in the past that they had to be the child's legal
guardian before the child could be enrolled in school." This law has the support
of several important interest groups that wish to provide basic necessities to
children while protecting the existing legal rights of their parents. 2 As times
change, the Legislature is apparently attempting to fashion mechanisms to insure
the health and welfare of the state's children.'3
Joseph A. Tommasino
Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1390 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (protesting that it is
particularly perverse to conclusively deny foster-care benefits to children living with needy relatives while
providing the same benefits to children living with strangers or in an institution).
10. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48204(d) (amended by Chapter 98).
11. ASSEMBLYJUDICIARYCOMMrITFEE, COMMrFrEEANALYSISOFSB 592, at 4 (May 4, 1994); see 1994
Cal. Leg. Serv. ch. 98 § 1, at 489 (declaring that the California Legislature is responding to its findings that
there was a 40% increase in the number of children who had lived with a nonparent relative during the 1980's
and that there are, according to the 1990 census, 673,563 minors living with nonparent relatives and 207,825
minors living with nonrelatives); ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMrrTEE, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 592, at 4
(May 4, 1994) (stating that guardianship proceedings are costly, time-consuming for all involved, and irritating
since relative caregivers must often make numerous trips to court despite the lack of personal transportation
and the presence of child-care conflicts); id. at 1-2 (asserting that 88% of state children lived with their own
parents while the remaining children were scattered among grandparents, other relatives, nonrelatives, and
group quarters); cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1984) (advocating
the view that states should develop options that do not presume the exclusivity of parenthood but instead
recognize the other kinds of familial relationships that children have developed); Candace M. Zierdt, Make New
Parents But Keep the Old, 69 N.D. L. REv. 497, 506 (1993) (recognizing that biology is a strong source of
identity for the child and that the concept of family should be extended to grandparents, godpaients, and even
previous foster parents).
12. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 592, at 4-5 (May 4, 1994); see
id. (noting the support of the following groups: (1) The California Judges Association, which believes that
many caregivers do not desire full guardianship or adoption but would rather have SB 592's limited legal
status; (2) Legal Services for Children, Inc., which feels that a guardianship requirement simply leaves too
many children unable to be enrolled in school; and (3) Sutter Center for Women's Health, which wants the
recent CAL-LEARN legislation to thrive and allow adolescents who are pregnant and/or parenting to attend
school full-time).
13. Peter C. Valente & Joann T. Palumbo, Standby Guardians, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 31, 1993, at 3; see id.
(explaining how the AIDS crisis has emphasized a need for an alternate approach to the appointment of a
guardian for children of a parent (who in many cases is a single parent), who is faced with death or chronic
incapacity); see also Fegelman, supra note 7, at Chicagoland 3 (estimating that by 1995, 45,700 children will
be parentless because of AIDS, and the number will rise to 80,000 by the year 2000); id. (noting that advocates
say a change in the law is needed not only because of the number of AIDS cases, but also to protect families
affected by any terminal illness).
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Family; reunification services-child conceived through molestation by
parent
Welfare and Institutions Code § 361.5 (amended).
AB 1082 (Andal); 1994 STAT. Ch. 57
Existing law provides that when a minor is removed from the custody of a
parent or guardian,' child welfare services are provided for the purpose of
reunifying2 the parent or guardian with the minor However, existing law also
states that such reunification services are not provided under circumstances where
the efforts would be fruitless.4 Chapter 57 adds to this set of circumstances the
situation where the minor was conceived in an act of sexual intercourse with a
child under fourteen years of age Chapter 57 only applies to the parent
committing the child molestation involving sexual intercourse which results in
conception.' However, Chapter 57 also provides that reunification may be granted
1. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1994) (placing a child in the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court when necessary to protect
the child from substantial risk of physical harm, emotional damage, sexual abuse or acts of cruelty); id. § 361
(West Supp. 1994) (permitting the court to take physical custody of a dependent child from the parents if the
court finds clear and convincing evidence of any of the following: (I) Danger to physical health; (2) severe
emotional damage; (3) substantial risk of or past sexual abuse; (4) no provision for support of the child; (5) the
parent has declined custody and has been notified that if the child remains out of custody for a year that the
child may be declared permanently free of the parent's custody and control).
2. See id. § 16500.5(c)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (defining family reunification services as including
counseling, mental health and substance abuse treatment, respite, day treatment, transportation, homemaking,
and family support services); In re Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th 435,446-47, 862 P.2d 751,758-59, 24 Cal. Rptr.
2d 751,758-59 (1993) (describing the policies of reunification services as first being to reunify the family, if
possible within a limited amount of time, but, if not, then to provide for permanent placement of the child
elsewhere); In re Brittany S., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1399, 1406-07, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50, 54 (1993) (adopting the rule
that reunification services must be tailored to the unique facts of each family's situation), review denied, 1993
Cal. LEXIS 6444 (1993); cf THE BACKLASH: CHILD PROTECTION UNDER FIRE 34-35 (John E.B. Myers ed.,
1994) (describing the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, which calls for removal of
children only when necessary, for efforts to return children after removal, and for placement of children in
permanent adoptive homes when return is not possible, as the basis for the modern child protection system in
the United States).
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (amended by Chapter 57).
4. Id. § 361.5(b)(l)-(6) (amended by Chapter 57); see In re Rebecca H., 227 Cal. App. 3d 825, 837,
278 Cal. Rptr. 185, 191 (1991) (referring to the exceptions in California Welfare and Institutions Code §
361.5(b) as the Legislature's recognition that under certain circumstances reunification will be fruitless); see
also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b) (amended by Chapter 57) (dispensing with the need for reunification
services where the parent's whereabouts are unknown, where the parent has a mental disability that would
make the services useless, where there has been repeated sexual or physical abuse, and other serious situations).
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(7) (amended by Chapter 57); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 288
(West Supp. 1994) (declaring as felonious the commission of any lewd or lascivious act with a child under the
age of 14); id. § 288.5 (West Supp. 1994) (declaring unlawful the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the
age of 14); see also In re Donald R., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1627, 1632, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 444 (1993)
(interpreting California Penal Code § 288 as an enactment of an outright ban against sexual contact with
children under 14 years of age).
6. CAL. WELT'. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(7) (amended by Chapter 57).
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to the parent who perpetrated the offense if the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that such reunification would serve the best interests of the
child.7
Existing law provides that when reunification services are not ordered due to
specified circumstances, the court must hold a permanency planning hearing8
within 120 days.9 Under Chapter 57 the court must also expedite the permanency
planning hearing when reunification services are denied to a parent who had
molested the child's other parent.'0
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 57 is intended to prevent a child molester from seeking reunification
with a child conceived via child molestation.11 Chapter 57 is aimed at men.12
However, due to its gender-neutral language, Chapter 57 could also have the
7. Id. §361.5(c) (amended by Chapter 57); cf. La Croix v. Deyo, 437 N.Y.S. 2d 517, 519 (1981)
(granting, in a paternity proceeding brought by an alleged father, the alleged father's motion to dismiss as
meritless a defense based on the allegations that at the time of the commencement of the sexual relationship,
the mother was 13 years old and at the time of conception she was 15 years old despite the fact that the alleged
father was thus guilty of a misdemeanor at the time of conception).
8. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.25 (West Supp. 1994) (describing a hearing where, if the child
is not to be returned to his or her parents, the court is to develop a permanent plan for the child's adoption or,
if adoption is not possible, long-term foster care); id. § 366.26 (West Supp. 1994) (describing a hearing at
which the court can terminate parental rights and develop a permanent plan for the child's adoption or, if
adoption is not possible, long-term foster care).
9. Id. §361.5(0 (amended by Chapter 57); see In re Rebecca H., 227 Cal. App. 3d 825, 838, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 185, 191 (1991) (explaining that if reunification is denied then the minor is placed on the "fast-track" to
permanency planning).
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(f) (amended by Chapter 57).
11. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrEE, COMMTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1082, at 2 (Mar. 15, 1994); see id.
(stating that the bill's author found three cases in San Joaquin County in which a child was conceived through
molestation and the molester sought reunification); id. (quoting the author as stating that placement of a child
with a molester raises the already high risk of recidivism); cf. ASSEMBLYFLOOR, COMMrTEE ANALYSISOFAB
1082, at 2 (Jan. 6, 1994) (stating that where the father of a child has been convicted of molesting the mother,
such person should not be able to involve himself in the life of the mother or child). But see Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (declaring, in the context of an adult mother and an adult father, that an unwed father
acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause when he demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood); In re Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th 435,450, 862 P.2d 751,761, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751,
761 (1994) (asserting, in the context of an adult mother and an adult father, when an unwed father promptly
comes forward and demonstrates commitment to emotional, financial and other parental responsibilities, his
parental relationship cannot be terminated consistent with due process absent a finding of unfitness).
12. AssEmBLY FLOOR, CommrrTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1082, at 2 (Jan. 6, 1994); see id. (mentioning sex
offenses committed against the child's mother); ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 1082, at 3 (May 19, 1993) (referring to the child's mother as the presumed victim of the sex offense); see
also SENATE JUDICIARY CoMITTEE, CommnrrrEa ANALYSIS OFAB 1082, at 2 (Mar. 15, 1994) (presupposing
that the age of the mother, only, would be determinative of whether a child molestation had occurred). But cf.
SENATE FLOOR, COMMrfTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1082, at 1-2 (Apr. 12, 1994) (avoiding throughout the committee
analysis any use of gender-specific terms).
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somewhat anomalous effect of denying reunification to a mother who conceived
the child when she was over fourteen and the father was under fourteen. 3
Owen TV Dukelow
Family; temporary removal of children from their homes
Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 306, 319 (amended).
AB 1579 (Polanco); 1994 STAT. Ch. 469
Existing law authorizes a social worker' to take temporary custody of a minor
in special circumstances 2 Existing law also requires the social worker, before
taking custody of the child, to determine whether there were any reasonable
13. Cf. Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Kan. 1993) (permitting a 13-year-
old father in a paternity proceeding to allege that he was a victim of statutory rape despite the fact that the 17-
year-old mother plea bargained to a lesser offense). But see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b) (amended
by Chapter 57) (permitting the court to order reunification if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that reunification is in the best interest of the minor).
1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4996 (West 1990) (requiring Licensed Clinical Scial Workers to
have a state license); id. § 4996.2(a)-(f) (West Supp. 1994) (listing requirements for licensure as a social
worker); see also id. § 28 (West 1990) (stating the Legislature's findings that clinical social workers need
adequate training in the assessment and prevention of child abuse, and setting out the required minimums for
training to be considered adequate).
2. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 306(a)(l)-(2) (amended by Chapter 469); see id. § 300 (West Supp.
1994) (describing the types of minors who may be determined to be a dependent child of the juvenile court,
including: a minor who has or will suffer serious physical abuse inflicted by the minor's parent or guardian,
a minor who has or will suffer serious physical harm as a result of the parent or guardian's neglect, and a minor
who has been sexually abused); id. § 305 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing a peace officer to take a minor into
temporary custody in similar circumstances); see also In re Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 207, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 694, 702-03 (1981) (upholding a lower court's finding that a removal of a physically abused child was
proper pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300); In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593,
601-02, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285 (1979) (holding that the denial of the Los Angeles County's Department of
Social Services petition for custody under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 was improper when
the child was left in thejoint custody of the father after the mother had severely physically abused the child);
In re Nicole B., 93 Cal. App. 3d 874,882,155 Cal. Rptr. 916,920 (1979) (holding that the placement of a child
in the custody of her mother after she had been physically abused by a man living with them, when the mother
had no knowledge of the abuse and the man had left the home and could not return, was proper); cf. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-313(a)(3) (Michie 1993) (allowing law enforcement officers to remove a child from his or her
home if the child is in immediate danger and removal is necessary to prevent serious harm to the child); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39A01(l)(b) (Vest 1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing that a law enforcement officer may take a
child into custody if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the child is in danger and removal is
necessary to avoid harm to the child); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE art. 621 (West 1994) (allowing a peace officer
to take a child into custody without a warrant if the officer has grounds to believe the situation requires the
child's immediate removal for its protection). See generally 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent
Children § 103 (1987) (describing the circumstances under which a peace officer and a social worker may take
a minor into temporary custody).
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services that could be provided which would allow the child to remain in the
custody of his or her parents or guardians.3
Chapter 469 requires the social worker, when making the decision whether
to remove the child from the house, to consider whether there is a person in the
house who has not harmed the child and can protect and care for the child, and
whether the person who has harmed the child is likely to leave the house and
remain away.4
Existing law requires a juvenile court engaged in a dependency proceeding
for a minor who had been removed from the custody of his or her parent or
guardian to determine if an effort had been made to provide any available services
that would have allowed the child to remain at home.5 Chapter 469 requires that
the court also determine if the social worker or peace officer attempted to find a
person in the house who would protect and care for the child, and to determine
if the child's abuser would leave the house and remain away
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 469 is to eliminate the need to remove a child from
an abusive household when it is unnecessary to do so because the child's abuser
voluntarily agrees to leave the house and remain away Chapter 469 seeks to
3. CAL- Wm. & INST. CODE § 306(b) (amended by Chapter 469); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
307.4(a) (Vest Supp. 1994) (requiring any peace officer, probation officer, or social worker who takes a child
into temporary custody to immediately inform the parents or guardian of the child by the most efficient means
available).
4. Id. § 306(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 469); see id. § 306(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 469) (requiring
a social worker, before taking a child into custody, to determine if there are any services which, if provided
to the parents or guardian of the child, would eliminate the need for the child's removal); id. § 306(b)(2)
(amended by Chapter 469) (requiring a social worker to determine if a referral to a public assistance program
would remove the need to take temporary custody of the child).
5. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 319 (amended by Chapter 469); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-328
(Michie 1993) (requiring the courts, before ordering the removal of a child from its home, to make specific
findings whether the removal is necessary to protect the child and whether any family services were made
available to prevent the removal); FLA. STAT. ANN. § ch. 39.402(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing that
a child taken into custody may be placed into a shelter only if necessary to protect the child and it is determined
that the provision of appropriate and available services will not obviate the need for the removal); id. §
39.402(7) (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting the removal of a child from his or her home if the provision of
appropriate and available services would allow the child to remain safely at home); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
301(3)(c) (1993) (allowing judges to issue an order to a law enforcement officer to take a child into custody
if there is no reasonable alternative to custody); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.183 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (requiring
that, in a juvenile court proceeding regarding the removal of a child from its home, the court make a
determination whether the provision of reasonable services would have allowed the child to remain safely at
home).
6. CAL. WarF. & INST. CODE § 319 (amended by Chapter 469).
7. SENATEJUDICIARYCOM1=lrEF, COMMrrTEEANALYSIS OFAB 1579, at 2 (June28, 1994); see CAL
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that it is the Legislature's intent to encourage
the continuity of the family unit by providing family preservation services that will remove the need for
removal of children from their homes, or lessen the length and impact of the removal).
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remedy the source of the problem, the abuse of the child, without punishing the
child by removal from his or her home.8
Jason Decker
Family; visitation rights for siblings of a deceased parent
Family Code § 3102 (amended).
AB 3042 (Boland); 1994 STAT. Ch. 164
Existing law provides that if either parent of an unemancipated minor' is
deceased, the children, parents, and grandparents of the deceased parent may be
granted reasonable visitation with the minor during his or her minority upon a
finding that the visitation would be in the best interest of the minor, as specified.2
Chapter 164 adds siblings of the deceased parent to those persons who may be
granted reasonable visitation? Chapter 164 also clarifies the use of the term
"grandparents" in the statute.4
8. SENATE JUDICIARY COmmrITIEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1579, at 2 (June 28, 1994); see CAL
WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that whenever a child is removed from a
parent's or guardian's custody, the court must order the probation officer to provide child welfare services for
the purpose of facilitating the reunification of the family); id. § 361.5(b)(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1994) (providing
that the court need not order child welfare services in order to facilitate the family reunification process if the
child came into the court's jurisdiction under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300, or as a result of
severe sexual or physical abuse by a parent or guardian); id. § 281.5 (West 1984) (providing that if a probation
officer removes a child pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300, the officer should give
primary consideration to placing the child with a relative, in order to facilitate family reunification),
1. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7002 (West 1994) (defining a person under the age of 18 years as an
emancipated minor if any of the following conditions are met: (1) The person has entered into a valid marriage,
whether or not the marriage has been dissolved; (2) the person is on active duty with the armed forces of the
United States; or (3) the person has received a declaration of emancipation pursuant to California Family Code
§ 7122).
2. Id. § 3102(a) (amended by Chapter 164); see id. § 200 (West 1994) (granting the superior court
jurisdiction in proceedings under this code); id. § 3022 (West 1994) (allowing the court, during the pendency
of a proceeding or at any time thereafter, to make an order for the custody of a minor that it deems necessary
or proper). See generally id. §§ 3400-3425 (West 1994) (establishing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act).
3. Id. § 3102(a) (amended by Chapter 164); see id. § 3102(b) (amended by Chapter 164) (requiring
the court to consider the amount of personal contact between the person and the child before the application
for the visitation order); id. § 3102(c) (amended by Chapter 164) (noting that this section does not apply if the
child has been adopted by a person other than a stepparent or grandparent of the child, and any visitation rights
granted pursuant to this section before the adoption of the child automatically terminate if the child is adopted
by a person other than a stepparent or grandparent of the child).
4. Id. § 3102(b)-(c) (amended by Chapter 164). Previously, the statute referred to "grandparents of the
deceased parent" in subsection (a), but subsections (b) and (c) only referred to "grandparents," thus creating
an ambiguity. Compare id. with 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 219, sec. 116.77, at 1363 (amending CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3102).
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INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
According to the author of Chapter 164, the siblings of a deceased parent are
family members who, in many instances, can be positive role models for the
child, and thus belong on the list of relatives of a deceased person who may
obtain visitation rights with a child of a deceased person.5 Several state
legislatures have reacted to the separation of siblings from one another by
enacting provisions to facilitate visitation.6 Other states have more general
5. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3042, at 1-2 (May 4, 1994); cf
Judy E. Nathan, Note, Visitation afterAdoption: In the Best Interest of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633,636
(1984) (discussing how both visitation and adoption statutes require that courts act to promote the welfare of
the child). See generally Annotation, Visitation Rights of Persons Other than Natural Parents or
Grandparents, I A.L.R. 4TH 1270 (1993) (examining the familial relationships which courts have recognized
in the awarding of visitation rights).
6. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-13-102 (Michie 1993) (providing for reasonable visitation for any person
who is a brother or sister, regardless of the degree of blood relationship); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para.
5/607(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994) (allowing the court to grant reasonable visitation privileges to a
grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of any minor child upon petition to the court by the grandparents
or great-grandparents or on behalf of the sibling); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344(C) (West Supp. 1994) (declaring
that if one of the parties in a marriage dies, the siblings of a minor child or children of the marriage may have
reasonable visitation rights to such child or children during their minority if the court finds that such rights
would be in the best interest of the child or children); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN., § 5-312(e) (1991) (stating
that after an adoption, if it is in the child's best interest, the adoptive parent and a nonconsenting natural parent
may agree to visitation privileges between the child and the natural parent or siblings); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125A.330(1) (Michie 1993) (asserting that if a parent of an unmarried minor child is deceased or divorced
or separated from the parent who has custody of the child, or his or her parental rights have been relinquished
or terminated, the district court in the county in which the child resides may grant to the grandparents, parents,
and other children of either parent of the child a reasonable right to visit the child during the child's minority,
based on the following considerations: (1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
party seeking visitation and the child; (2) the capacity and disposition of the party seeking visitation to give
the child, among other things, love, affection, and guidance; (3) the prior relationship between the child and
the party seeking visitation; (4) the moral fitness of the party seeking visitation; (5) the mental and physical
health of the party seeking visitation; (6) the reasonable preference of the child, if the child has a preference,
and if the child is determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a preference; (7) the willingness and ability
of the party seeking visitation to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child
and the parent or parents; (8) the medical and other needs of the child related to health as affected by the
visitation; and (9) any other factor considered relevant by the court to a particular dispute); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-7.1(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that a grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in the state
may apply for an order for visitation, and requiring the applicant to bear the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child, based on the
following factors: (I) The relationship between the child and the applicant; (2) the relationship between each
of the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the applicant; (3) the time elapsed since
the child last had contact with the applicant; (4) the effect that such visitation will have on the relationship
between the child and the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the applicant; (5)
the time sharing arrangement existing between the parents with regard to the child, if the parents are divorced
or separated; (6) the good faith of the applicant in filing the application; (7) any history of physical, emotional,
or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant; and (8) any other factor relevant to the best interest of the child);
id. § 9:2-7.1(c) (West Supp. 1994) (noting that, with regard to any application, it will beprinafacie evidence
that visitation is in the best interest of the child if the applicant, in the past, had been a full-time caretaker for
the child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-32(H) (Michie Supp. 1994) (describing that when grounds exist for a
permanent guardianship for a child, the court may incorporate into the final order, provisions for visitation with
the natural parents, siblings, or other relatives of the child, and any other provision necessary to rehabilitate
the child or provide for the child's continuing safety and well being); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney
Supp. 1994) (allowing, under equitable circumstances, a brother or sister, or a proper person on behalf of a
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provisions for visitation by "others," "other relatives," or "any person." 7 Chapter
164, in particular, recognizes that family members of all types need each other's
strengths and associations in their common experiences, and separating them
unnecessarily is likely to be traumatic and harmful since the presence of relatives
together serves to nourish familial bonds that can endure for a lifetime.8
Joseph A. Tommasino
child, whether by half or whole blood, to apply to the supreme court for visitation rights for such brother or
sister with respect to such child); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-a(l-a) (McKinney 1993) (noting that placement
or regular visitation and communication with siblings or half-siblings will be presumptively in the child's best
interests unless such placement or visitation and communication would be contrary to the child's health, safety,
or welfare, or the lack of geographic proximity precludes or prevents visitation).
7. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (1991) (providing that a court may make, modify, or vacate an
order for the custody of or visitation with the minor child that may seem necessary or proper, including an
order that provides for visitation by a grandparent or other person if that is in the best interest of the child);
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West 1993) (permitting the court to provide for reasonable visitation of
the child by the parties involved, the maternal or paternal grandparents, or by others, by general or specific
terms and conditions); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3109.051(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1993) (declaring that in a
divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, annulment, or child support proceeding that involves a child,
the court may grant reasonable companionship or visitation rights to any grandparent, any person related to
the child by consanguinity or affinity, or any other person other than a parent, if all of the following apply: (1)
The grandparent, relative, or other person files a motion with the court seeking companionship or visitation
rights; (2) the court determines that the grandparent, relative, or other person has an interest in the welfare of
the child; and (3) the court determines that the granting of companionship or visitation rights is in the best
interest of the child).
8. See Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 6 CORNELL L. REV. 1187, 1190;
(recognizing that courts realize the importance of the sibling relationship and are reluctant to disrupt it); see
also Obey v. Degling, 337 N.E.2d 601,602 (N.Y. 1975) (emphasizing that bonds between brothers and sisters
are strengthened by the likelihood that parents will pass away before their children). See generally DAVID
FANSHELL & EUGENE B. SHINN, Children in Foster Care (1978) (suggesting that the intellectual, psychological,
and physical development of children in long-term foster care is enhanced by visitation and contact, however
minimal, with the biological family, for children exposed to sustained separation from their families are most
vulnerable to the development of serious cognitive and personality impairments).
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